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In international relations literature, there seems to be some confusion caused by 
the many contradictory theories on alliance formation patterns. For this reason, this thesis 
surveys why there is not just one theory that explains most of the alliance formations 
throughout history. Using logistic regression models and statistical analysis for different 
historical periods from 1816 to 2012, the thesis explores the effects of four state-level 
variables—regime type, national material capabilities, geographical proximity, and trade 
exchange—on alliance formation behaviors.  
The results show that the four state-level variables have different levels of 
significance in the different periods. The thesis concludes that alliance formation 
behaviors differ depending on the prevailing system-level conditions in the different 
historical periods, especially under conditions of war and peace and based on the polarity 
of the international system. The approach presented in the thesis provides a new 
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“If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition.”1 By these words, 
Napoleon revealed his low opinion of the importance and strength of alliances; however, 
while Napoleon proved to be decisive in conquering other countries one at a time, an 
alliance of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia defeated him in 1815.2 Ultimately, 
history defied Napoleon and his underestimation of the power of alliances in times of 
war. In the words of international relations scholar Stephen Walt, an expert on alliances, 
“those who cause others to align against them are at a significant disadvantage.”3 
Although most political scientists and researchers agree on the importance of 
alliances in international relations and their effects on wars, they disagree on how to 
explain the reasons for and mechanisms of alliance formation. Most of the debates are 
based on which theory explains more historical cases as proof of its validity. For 
example, Walt presents case studies from the 20th century Middle East to prove his 
balance of threat theory,4 whereas William Wohlforth et al. refute it based on case studies 
that start with Assyria in 900 BCE and cover 2000 years of international politics.5 
Additionally, Michael Atfeld uses case studies from the 19th century to show how 
alliances form according to rational-choice theory,6 whereas Kevin Sweeney and Paul 
Fritz only examine great powers’ alliances in the same period to show that an interest-
based theory better explains the alliance behavior of states.7  
                                                 
1. Ole R. Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New 
York: Wiley, 1973), 22. 
2. Holsti, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 5. 
3. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), Preface. 
4. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 50. 
5. William C. Wohlforth et al., “Testing the Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” European 
Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (June 2007): 155. 
6. Michael F. Atfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” The Western Political Quarterly 37, 
no. 4 (December 1984): 523–544. 
7. Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, “Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for 
Great Power Alliances,” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 2 (2004): 428–449. 
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This thesis aims to achieve a better understanding of the patterns of alliance 
formation and the reasons behind the diversity of conclusions in alliance formation 
success. We argue that varying conditions in different historical periods lead to different 
alliance behaviors that cannot be captured by a single theory. By identifying the 
prevailing conditions in the international system during the different periods included in 
the analysis, we attempt to relate these conditions to the alliance behavior at the state 
level, which allows us to have a better understanding of future alliance behaviors under 
similar conditions. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the different theories of alliance 
formation to identify possible reasons for the disagreements on how to explain alliance 
patterns. We then provide a conceptual framework to bridge the gap between these 
theories by presenting our main hypothesis, which focuses on providing a systematic way 
to understand how and why different patterns in alliance behaviors emerge. We then 
present a detailed methodology for testing our main hypothesis.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several predominant theories exist to explain the conditions under which states 
form alliances. The classic “realist” theory of alliance formation among states is known 
as the “Balance of Power” theory. Among the most known advocates of this theory are 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and George Liska. Morgenthau in Politics Among 
Nations points out that the notion of the Balance of Power can be interpreted “(1) as a 
policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state of affairs, (3) as an 
approximately equal distribution of power, [and] (4) as any distribution of power.”8 He 
further argues that the concept is based on the widely used phenomenon of “equilibrium” 
in which “the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only 
inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations.”9 
                                                 
8. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1972), 167. 
9. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 167. 
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For Waltz, “states behave in ways that result in balances forming.”10 Even when 
the balance is disrupted by one coalition’s win over another, the winning coalition’s unity 
will eventually weaken, and the balance will be restored again.11 This occurs because 
security is the most essential end goal for states, and increased power, paradoxically, may 
not achieve that end. One of the reasons why a preponderance of power may lead to 
insecurity is that the division of gains in the winning coalition may favor some countries 
more and thus create security challenges to the others.12 Liska builds on these 
observations and uses historical cases to prove the significance of the Balance of Power 
theory. For instance, Otto von Bismarck—as the first imperial chancellor of Germany—
used his system of alliances in order to keep the equilibrium of forces and in the 
meantime maintain peace in Europe based on a mutual-assistance alliance of all great 
powers.13  
On the other hand, many researchers challenge the validity of the Balance of 
Power theory. Paul W. Schroeder, for example, gives the same example of the 
Bismarckian system of alliances to argue that the balance of power was not the main 
purpose of all of Bismarck’s alliances, but sometimes, he used alliances for the 
management and control of his enemies.14 Additionally, Brian Healy and Arthur Stein 
conclude that the existing theories—among them the Balance of Power—have been 
overgeneralized through history. The authors argue that these theories might fit for a 
certain period (or periods) of time, but might not fit for other eras. Given the results 
Healy and Stein have reached, “a careful observer of contemporary international politics 
                                                 
10. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 125. 
11. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 
12. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 106. 
13. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), 32–33. 
14. Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in 
Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1976), 242. 
 4 
would be wise to reconsider the tried and apparently untrue generalizations that have long 
passed for balance of power theory.”15  
Other authors present “Bandwagoning” as an alternative to balance of power 
theory. Henry A. Kissinger argues,  
theorists of the balance of power often leave the impression that it is the 
natural form of international relations. In fact, balance-of-power systems 
have existed only rarely in human history. […] For the greatest part of 
humanity and the longest part of history empire has been the typical mode 
of government. […] Empires have no need for a balance of power.16 
Walt also questions the Balance of Power theory by introducing some examples where 
weaker states bandwagoned with the stronger states rather than balancing against them. 
He contends that “states stand to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the 
greatest threat.”17  
Accordingly, Walt presents “Balance of Threat” theory as an alternative to 
Balance of Power theory. He maintains that it has a better explanatory power because it 
takes into account the effect of “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and 
perceived intentions” on alliance formation.18 Whereas Waltz admits that the Balance of 
Power theory is not intended to explain the particular choices of states, Walt claims that 
the Balance of Threat theory can predict these choices because “a state [tends to] ally 
with the side it believes is least dangerous.”19 Focusing on historical cases of alliances in 
the Middle East from 1955 to 1979, Walt concludes that pragmatic interests and security 
considerations are more significant for alliance formation than ideological preferences.20 
However, Randall Schweller contends that Walt’s Balance of Threat theory only 
tests the alliance behaviors of threatened states and ignores the behavior of unthreatened 
                                                 
15. Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and 
Reality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 17,  no. 1 (March, 1973): 59. 
16. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 21. 
17. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21. 
18. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 5. 
19. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 121, 264. 
20. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 33. 
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states.21 Schweller proposes the “Balance of Interests” theory to claim that states tend to 
bandwagon for profit contrary to the balancing behavior claimed by realist theorists.22 
Kevin Sweeny and Paul Fritz builds on Schweller’s theory to argue that the 
balance of threat theory, as well as balance of power theory, explain 
alliance formation only in high-insecurity environments when survival is 
at stake and […] it seems that interest similarity—where both security and 
nonsecurity interests are considered—rather than threat alone provides a 
more complete explanation for alliance formation.23 
More recently, in “Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the 
Napoleonic International System,” Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo apply game 
theory to test the Balance of Threat theory. They conclude that only when the threat 
caused by an aggressor declines to a certain level, the collective action problem is 
resolved and a balancing alliance is formed. Above a certain level of threat, states tend to 
bandwagon with the aggressor and below it, they tend to balance against the aggressor’s 
threat.24 For other authors, game theory by itself explains the mechanisms and reasons of 
alliance formation. William H. Riker uses John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s 
“Minimax” theorem and the “n-Person Game” theory, previously used for economical 
behavior, to analyze political behavior in alliances. He then introduces the “Size 
Principle,” which states that “only minimum winning coalitions occur.”25 Benjamin 
Fordham and Paul Poast point out that Riker’s Size Principle has been long neglected and 
it is a powerful means in explaining both offensive and defensive alliances. In the case of 
offensive alliances, a certain minimum size can secure the alliance’s goals, whereas a 
larger size can reduce the benefits to each of the other members.26 In defensive alliances, 
                                                 
21. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 83. 
22. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 99. 
23. Sweeney and Fritz, “Jumping on the Bandwagon,” 436. 
24. Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, “Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of 
the Napoleonic International System,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 1996): 497.  
25. William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 
32. 
26. Benjamin Fordham and Paul Poast, “All Alliances are Multilateral: Rethinking Alliance 
Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 1 (2014): 5–6. 
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they argue that the additional members’ potential conflicts may establish a commitment 
problem for the alliance.27 
The summary of the literature on alliance formation theories raises the following 
question: Why is there not just one theory that explains most of the alliance formations 
throughout history? We argue that the difficulty in agreeing on a common theory that 
explains most alliance formations lies in the different prevailing conditions during a 
certain historical period and consequently in the unique behavioral patterns of the states 
and their leaders.  
B. MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
Although there is not one single theory that explains all alliance formation 
behaviors throughout history, we test whether certain prevailing conditions at the system 
level in different eras cause similar alliance formation patterns. Our main hypothesis is 
that we can determine the conditions that affect alliances by relating the alliance patterns 
to system-level conditions, which leads to a better understanding of alliance behaviors 
under similar conditions in future alliances. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To test the hypothesis, the analysis advances in the following order (refer to 
Figure 1). First, based on previous research and existing literature, the following 
conditions are examined to determine their relevance to alliance formation behaviors. 
These conditions include the following variables: regime type, national material 
capabilities, geographical proximity, and trade exchange. Second, we define the eras that 
potentially have common alliance formation patterns relying mainly on previously 
distinguished timeframes characterized by important events or conflicts that introduced a 
critical change in international relations. Specifically, these timeframes include the post-
Napoleonic era (1816–1914), World War I (1914–1918), the interwar period (1918–
1939), World War II (1939–1945), the Cold War (1945–1990), and the post–Cold War 
era (1990–2012). Third, we specify whether or not an alliance was formed between each 
                                                 
27. Fordham and Poast, “All Alliances are Multilateral,” 6. 
 7 
of the dyads of states present in the international system in each of the previously defined 
periods. 
Figure 1.  Flow Chart of the Methodology 
 
The next step is to use logistic regression models to analyze the relationship 
between each of the different conditions (as independent variables) and the alliance 
formation behavior (as a dependent variable) in each era. The results of this analysis 
determine the significance of each of the conditions in relation to the alliance behaviors 
in a specific era. In this way, we can distinguish the conditions that are significant to 
states’ alliance behaviors in certain eras and whether or not the same conditions can cause 
different behaviors or are less significant in other eras. We then analyze whether the 
system-level conditions for each era (the polarity of the system and the state of war and 
peace) have an effect on the different alliance behavior patterns. 
The thesis draws on the following data sets to test our hypothesis. We use the 
Correlates of War Project’s list of alliances, the Formal Interstate Alliances data set 
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(v4.1), which identifies the alliance formations from 1816 to 2012.28 Accordingly, the 
dataset provided by Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees differentiates between 
four types of alliances:  
The alliance type was coded as ‘I’ [for] defense pact, ‘II’ [for] neutrality 
or non-aggression pact, or ‘III’ [for] entente. Generally, Type I alliances 
imposed a higher level of obligation on the signatories than the Type II 
alliances, and both Types I and II imposed greater obligations than Type 
III alliances.29  
For our analysis, we follow the same concept of defining a military alliance as Andrew 
G. Long did, and we therefore use defense pacts as the only type of military agreement 
that meets the requirements for a military alliance.30 Several other researchers have also 
used defense pacts in their studies to present a similar argument.31 
Therefore, our list of alliances starts with the military agreements between the 
European countries of the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in 
1816 and ends with the defense pact between Armenia and Russia, which was signed on 
August 20, 2010, extending Russia’s permissible military presence in Armenia until 2044 
in exchange for security guarantees.32 To observe the alliance formation behavior, we test 
four independent variables that are likely to affect alliance formation. The trade data are 
derived from the Correlates of War Project Bilateral Trade data set (v3.0).33 Our model 
also includes the states’ capabilities that are measured using the Correlates of War Project 
                                                 
28. Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances: 1648-2008. 
29. Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees, ”Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War 
Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 2 (2004): 212.  
30. Andrew G. Long, “Defense Pacts and International Trade,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 5 
(September 2003): 542. 
31. T. Camber Warren, “The Geometry of Security: Modeling Interstate Alliances as Evolving 
Networks,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (2010): 705; Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, “Jumping on 
the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances,” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 
2 (2004): 431. 
32. Jaroslaw Wisniewski, “EU energy diversification policy and the case of South Caucasus,” Political 
Perspectives 5,  no. 2 (2011): 65. 
33. Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Ver. 3.0 
(2012), accessed May 2, 2015, http://correlatesofwar.org.  
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National Material Capabilities dataset (v4.0).34 Additionally, the Direct Contiguity data 
set (v3.1) of the Correlates of War coding system allows us to create a dichotomous 
variable representing geographical proximity between states.35 Finally, to capture the 
regime type of states, we use the 21-point scaled Polity scores from the Polity IV 
dataset.36 
The thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter II, we introduce the different 
hypotheses related to the aforementioned independent variables. Next, we apply different 
regression models to test these hypotheses, and we present the empirical results. In 
Chapter III, we introduce system-level analysis to understand how the significance of 
each of the variables at the state level changes from one period to another. In this respect, 
we analyze each of the four variables in a separate section. In the final chapter, we offer 
conclusions.   
The thesis finds that the four state-level variables (regime type, national material 
capabilities, geographical proximity, and trade exchange) have varying levels of impact 
on alliance formation during different systemic conditions. By comparing the results 
across different international systems, clear differences in alliance behaviors emerge 
between times of peace and war. Moreover, alliance behaviors are more consistent in 
unipolar and bipolar international systems than in multipolar systems.  
                                                 
34. J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 
1816-1985,” International Interactions 14 (1987): 115–132. 
35. Correlates of War Project, Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006, Ver. 3.1, accessed May 21, 2015, 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
36. Center for Systemic Peace, “Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2014,” accessed May 21, 2015, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
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II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we apply several logistic regression models to test the effect of 
four state-level independent variables (regime type, national material capabilities, 
geographical proximity, and trade exchange) on the alliance behavior of states. To 
perform the analysis, we present four null hypotheses to test, each related to one variable, 
using logistic models. The results of the analysis reveal the significance of each of these 
variables on the likelihood of alliance formation in the different periods. 
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION  
The analysis is based on a logistic regression model, which is represented by 
Equation 1. The model analyzes whether or not an alliance is formed, A (as a dependent 
variable), in relation to the states’ national capabilities, C, the trade exchange between 
them, T, the difference in regime types, R, and their geographical proximity to each 
other, G. The model is represented by 
𝐴𝐴 =  𝑒𝑒(𝜀𝜀+ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿)
1+ 𝑒𝑒(𝜀𝜀+ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿)               (1) 
A logistic regression model is applied because the dependent variable A is binary. 
In other words, two countries either ally with each other (given a value of 1), or they do 
not (given a value of 0). The parameters α, β, γ, and δ are the rates of change associated 
with each of the independent variables, and the parameter ε is an estimate of the error. 
The regression model is applied separately to the following periods: post-
Napoleonic era (1816–1914), World War I (1914–1918), the interwar period (1918–
1939), World War II (1939–1945), the Cold War (1945–1990), and the post–Cold War 
era (1990–2012). The results of the analysis determine the significance of each of the 
variables on the alliance behaviors in a specific era. In this respect, conditions that are 
significant to the states’ alliance behaviors in a certain era might cause different 
behaviors or have less significance in other eras. 
 12 
The following hypotheses summarize the initial assumptions about the 
relationships between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables: 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the difference in the capabilities of two states, 
the more likely they will ally. 
Hypothesis 2: Stronger trade relations between two states lead to a higher 
likelihood for an alliance to form. 
Hypothesis 3: A state is more likely to ally with another state of a similar 
regime type than with a state of a different regime type. 
Hypothesis 4: It is more likely for states that are geographically closer to 
form an alliance than those that are geographically distant from each other.  
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Before applying the logistic regression analysis, the data is arranged in five steps. 
First, the Alliance Formation behavior, as a dependent variable, is included in the 
analysis as dyads of all the countries that existed in the international system in the 
different periods defined previously. The dependent variable takes a value of 0 (if no 
alliance is formed) or 1 (if an alliance is formed). Second, the economic relations are 
included in the data set as the value of the total size of the Trade Exchange between the 
two countries. Third, the countries’ capabilities are measured according to the Composite 
Index of National Capability. Then, a Ratio of the Capabilities (the lower index divided 
by the higher index) is included in the analysis.  
Fourth, the Geographical Proximity of two countries is measured according to the 
classification used in the Direct Contiguity dataset, in which  
the classification system for contiguous dyads is comprised of five 
categories, one for land contiguity and four for water contiguity. Land 
contiguity is defined as the intersection of the homeland territory of the 
two states in the dyad, either through a land boundary or a river. Water 
contiguity is divided into four categories, based on a separation by 
water of 12, 24, 150, and 400 miles.37 
                                                 
37. Correlates of War Project, Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006, Ver. 3.1.  
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The Geographical Proximity is included in the analysis as a dummy variable. It is 
assigned a value of 1 in case the two countries in the alliance dyads fall within the first 
three groups in the Direct Contiguity classification system (land contiguity and the first 
two categories in the water contiguity), in which case they are considered geographically 
close. The Geographical Proximity variable is assigned a value of 0 for the other 
categories, in which case the countries are considered geographically distant from each 
other.  
Fifth, the Difference in Regime Types is included as a measurement of the 
absolute difference in the democratic scores of two countries according to the “Polity IV 
Annual Time-Series, 1800–2014” which assigns values between -10 for the less 
democratic states and 10 for the most democratic states.  
The variables are derived from different data sets. The alliance formation 
behavior (as a dependent variable) is taken from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate 
Alliances data set (v4.1).38 The trade relations are taken from the Bilateral Trade data set 
(v3.0).39 The states’ capabilities are measured according to the National Material 
Capabilities dataset (v4.0).40 The geographical distance is assigned according to the 
Direct Contiguity data set (v3.1).
41
 The regime types are taken from the “Polity IV 
Annual Time-Series, 1800–2014.”
42
 The analysis is based on a 5% significance level. 
It is important to note that the independent variables used in the regression 
analysis have different numbers of observations. For example, most of the records for the 
Trade Exchange variable are missing before and during the two World Wars, as can be 
seen from the comparison of the number of observations in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
                                                 
38. Gibler, International Military Alliances: 1648-2008.” 
39. Barbieri and Keshk, Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Ver. 3.0.  
40. Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-
1985.” 
41. Correlates of War Project, Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006, Ver 3.1. 
42. Center for Systemic Peace, “Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2014.” 
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Table 1.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1816–2012 (All 
Independent Variables Included) 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  
 Historical Periods 
 1816-1914 1914-1918 1918-1939 1939-1945 1945-1990 1991-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ratio of CINC 0.807*** -52.267 1.884*** 0.294 0.607*** 0.581*** 
 (0.259) (72,121.240) (0.186) (7.391) (0.027) (0.033) 
       Trade Exchange -0.00000 0.726 0.002*** -0.315 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.00001) (288.435) (0.0003) (0.344) (0.00001) (0.00000) 
       Difference in  
Regime Types  -0.023 -6.821 0.028
*** 0.058 -0.075*** -0.163*** 
 (0.015) (5,247.558) (0.009) (1.270) (0.001) (0.002) 
       Geographical 
Proximity -0.243 300.904 1.710
*** 15.429 1.802*** 2.061*** 
 (0.200) (111,206.700) (0.116) (3,549.713) (0.024) (0.031) 
       Constant -3.489*** -290.938 -4.743*** -15.220 -2.217*** -1.971*** 
 (0.152) (115,054.100) (0.137) (3,549.738) (0.014) (0.017) 
        Observations 6,667 28 10,597 23 245,447 177,287 
Log Likelihood -871.351 -1.386 -1,377.985 -5.052 -64,465.750 -41,933.290 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,752.703 12.773 2,765.970 20.105 128,941.500 83,876.590 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the 
standard error. 
 
This variation in observations affects the regression analysis when all the 
variables are introduced together in the analysis because the missing data for a certain 
variable causes the exclusion of the data for the other variables for a certain observation. 
Therefore, the logistic regression analysis is repeated several times to prevent any bias in 
the results caused by missing data. While Table 1 summarizes the results of the 
regression models for all the periods with all the independent variables included in the 
analysis, Table 2 presents the results for all the periods excluding the Trade Exchange 
variable. 
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Table 2.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1816–2012 
(Independent Variables Excluding the Trade Exchange) 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  
 Historical Periods 
 1816-1914 1914-1918 1918-1939 1939-1945 1945-1990 1991-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ratio of CINC 0.761*** 0.663** 1.497*** -0.359** 0.542*** 0.478*** 
 (0.088) (0.278) (0.122) (0.159) (0.018) (0.023) 
       Difference in  
Regime Types -0.096
*** 0.032* 0.019*** -0.005 -0.070*** -0.172*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
       Geographical 
Proximity 2.560
*** 1.678*** 2.852*** 1.708*** 2.156*** 2.327*** 
 (0.048) (0.191) (0.076) (0.109) (0.016) (0.021) 
       Constant -4.324*** -4.581*** -5.731*** -3.533*** -2.429*** -2.044*** 
 (0.052) (0.180) (0.087) (0.085) (0.009) (0.011) 
        Observations 97,262 7,972 74,228 21,038 628,746 427,488 
Log Likelihood -7,882.180 -729.302 -3,772.084 -2,697.846 -147,608.300 -90,605.420 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,772.360 1,466.605 7,552.169 5,403.692 295,224.500 181,218.800 
 Notes: Significance Levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parenthesis is the 
standard error. 
 
This variation in observations affects the regression analysis when all the 
variables are introduced together in the analysis because the missing data for a certain 
variable causes the exclusion of the data for the other variables for a certain observation. 
Therefore, the logistic regression analysis is repeated several times to prevent any bias in 
the results caused by missing data. While Table 1 summarizes the results of the 
regression models for all the periods with all the independent variables included in the 
analysis, Table 2 presents the results for all the periods excluding the Trade Exchange 
variable. 
Therefore, when introducing the Trade Exchange variable, the number of 
observations decreases from 97,262 to 6,667 (ratio of 1:14.6) in the period of 1816–1914, 
from 7,972 to 28 (ratio is 1:284.7) in World War I, and from 21,038 to 23 (ratio of 
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1:914.7) in World War II. The distortion caused by Trade Exchange has a lesser effect 
for the other periods. During the interwar period (1918–1939), the reduction in the 
number of observations has a ratio of 1:7, and after 1945, the ratio is about 1:3. For the 
other variables, few data are missing, which presumably has less effect on the analysis. In 
all cases, the regression models are repeated for each period by varying the variables 
introduced in the analysis in order to check the effect of the missing data on the 
authenticity of the results.  
C. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the results of the logistic regression analysis 
models for each period separately. In each of these tables, the logistics regression 
analysis is repeated for all the possible combinations of independent variables for two 
reasons: first, to control for any correlation between the independent variables and, 
second, to check for the effect of any missing data. 
1. Post-Napoleonic Era (1816–1914) 
As can be seen from Table 3, running the regression model for each of the 
independent variables separately reveals that all are significant except for Trade 
Exchange. Introducing the Trade Exchange variable affects the significance of two of the 
other variables (Difference in Regime Types and Geographical Proximity) as can be seen 
from the model in column 1 in Table 3. The model in column 7 shows that the Trade 
Exchange variable in itself is not significant for the formation of alliances in this period. 
Moreover, the results in the other models show that including or excluding any of the 
other variables does not influence the significance of the remaining variables.  
Thus, after excluding the Trade Exchange variable from the model in column 2, 
the results reveal that the Ratio of the Capabilities and Geographical Proximity are 
positively related to the formation of alliances, and the Difference in Regime Types is 
negatively related. This implies that countries with similar national capabilities and that 
are geographically closer are more likely to ally with each other. The negative and 
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statistically significant coefficient for the Difference in Regime Types indicates that states 
with similar regime types tend to ally with each other. 
Table 3.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1816–1914 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of 
CINC 0.807
*** 0.761***  0.759
*** 0.954*** 0.936***    
 (0.259) (0.088)  (0.080) (0.052) (0.047)    
          Trade 
Exchange -0.00000      -0.00000   
 (0.00001)      (0.00001)   
          Difference in 
Regime 
Types 
-0.023 -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.137***    -0.138
***  
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)    (0.007)  
          Geographical 
Proximity -0.243 2.560
*** 2.581***  2.693
***    2.706
*** 
 (0.200) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.029)    (0.029) 
          Constant -3.489*** -4.324*** -4.119*** -3.454*** -4.100*** -3.377*** -2.926*** -3.242*** -3.827*** 
 (0.152) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.027) (0.021) (0.052) (0.034) (0.020) 
           Observations 6,667 97,262 98,370 97,262 127,936 127,936 7,525 98,370 129,284 
Log 
Likelihood 
-71.351 -7,882.180 -7,929.590 -9,143.008 -18,726.090 -22,556.840 -1,513.629 -9,209.357 -18,932.750 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 
1,752.703 15,772.360 15,865.180 18,292.020 37,458.180 45,117.690 3,031.258 18,422.710 37,869.490 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the standard 
error. 
 
2. World War I (1914–1918) 
Table 4 shows that the Trade Exchange variable, which is statistically 
insignificant by itself, affects the significance of the other variables because it 
considerably affects the number of observations, as was mentioned earlier. On the other 
hand, the other variables do not affect each other’s statistical significance.  
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Table 4.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1914–1918 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of 
CINC -52.267 0.663
**  0.814
*** 0.510** 0.815***    
 (72,121.240) (0.278)  (0.270) (0.233) (0.218)    
          Trade 
Exchange 0.726      -0.009   
 (288.435)      (0.011)   
          Difference in 
Regime Types -6.821 0.032
* 0.033* 0.010    0.011  
 (5,247.558) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)    (0.017)  
          Geographical 
Proximity 300.904 1.678
*** 1.781***  2.331
***    2.420
*** 
 (111,206.700) (0.191) (0.190)  (0.136)    (0.135) 
          Constant -290.938 -4.581*** -4.472*** -4.214*** -4.321*** -3.905*** -1.733* -4.050*** -4.241*** 
 (115,054.100) (0.180) (0.162) (0.165) (0.108) (0.094) (0.992) (0.143) (0.086) 
           Observations 28 7,972 8,414 7,972 9,870 9,870 28 8,414 10,356 
Log 
Likelihood -1.386 -729.302 -738.502 -759.762 -1,014.416 -1,133.503 -6.631 -772.466 -1,023.861 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 12.773 1,466.605 1,483.005 1,525.525 2,034.832 2,271.006 17.263 1,548.932 2,051.721 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the standard 
error. 
 
As for the results, the Ratio of the Capabilities and Geographical Proximity are 
positively related to the formation of alliances. In other words, countries with similar 
national capabilities and that are geographically closer are more likely to ally with each 
other. As for the Difference in Regime Types, there is not enough evidence to infer that it 
is statistically significant on the 95% confidence level. 
3. Interwar Period (1918–1939) 
As can be seen from Table 5, all the independent variables are positively related 
to the formation of alliances in the interwar period. Introducing the Trade Exchange 
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variable affects the number of observations, but not to the extent that it changes the 
statistical significance of the other variables. Moreover, the variables remain significant 
whether introduced alone in the analysis or in combination with other variables.  
Table 5.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1918–1939 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of 
CINC 1.884
*** 1.497***  1.698
*** 1.238*** 1.430***    
 (0.186) (0.122)  (0.114) (0.115) (0.109)    
          Trade 
Exchange 0.002
***      0.003
***   
 (0.0003)      (0.0003)   
          Difference in 
Regime 
Types 
0.028*** 0.019*** 0.021*** -0.012**    -0.013
**  
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006)  
          Geographical 
Proximity 1.710
*** 2.852*** 2.944***  2.769
***    2.832
*** 
 (0.116) (0.076) (0.076)  (0.070)    (0.069) 
          Constant -4.743*** -5.731*** -5.245*** -5.007*** -5.415*** -4.932*** -3.416*** -4.420*** -5.025*** 
 (0.137) (0.087) (0.073) (0.076) (0.062) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.046) 
           Observations 10,597 74,228 74,406 74,228 78,318 78,318 11,167 74,406 78,516 
Log 
Likelihood -1,377.985 -3,772.084 -3,845.131 -4,323.032 -4,191.981 -4,798.262 -1,687.522 -4,428.697 -4,248.294 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 2,765.970 7,552.169 7,696.263 8,652.064 8,389.962 9,600.525 3,379.044 8,861.395 8,500.588 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the standard 
error. 
 
However, comparing the models in columns 1, 3, and 4 in Table 5 reveals a shift 
from positive to negative in the relationship between the regime types and the formation 
of alliances. While the model in column 1 includes all the independent variables, the 
model in column 3 introduces the Geographical Proximity and the Difference in Regime 
Types in the analysis without the other variables. Moreover, the model in column 4 
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excludes the Geographical Proximity from the analysis. Therefore, to test which model 
better explains the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, we use 
the methodology recommended by T. Camber Warren in his piece, “Not by the Sword 
Alone,” which is based on generating receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves for 
the different models. Then, the area under each curve (the AUC statistic), which 
“represents a measure of the overall predictive accuracy of the model,”43 is measured. In 
our case, Figure 2 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for Models 
(1), (3) and (4) to compare their predictive accuracies. 




                                                 
43. T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of 
State Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (January 2014): 129. 
 21 
The AUC statistic for the three models reveals that the predictive accuracy of 
Model (1) with all the independent variables included is the highest (0.7757), while the 
predictive accuracy of Model (4) is the lowest. Consequently, the results of the analysis 
using Model (1) show that all the independent variables are positively related to the 
formation of alliances. In other words, states with higher trade exchange, similar national 
capabilities, different regime types, and that are geographically closer are more likely to 
ally with each other during this period.  
4. World War II (1939–1945) 
Table 6 shows that the Trade Exchange variable, which is statistically 
insignificant by itself, affects the significance of the other variables because it 
considerably affects the number of observations, as previously mentioned (see the model 
in column 1).  
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Table 6.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1939–1945 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of CINC 0.294 -0.359**  -0.131 -0.165 0.036    
 (7.391) (0.159)  (0.154) (0.145) (0.141)    
          Trade 
Exchange -0.315      -0.157   
 (0.344)      (0.181)   
          Difference in 
Regime Types 0.058 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012
*    -0.012
*  
 (1.270) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.007)  
          Geographical 
Proximity 15.429 1.708
*** 1.673***  1.858
***    1.828
*** 
 (3,549.713) (0.109) (0.107)  (0.095)    (0.094) 
          Constant -15.220 -3.533*** -3.638*** -3.364*** -3.683*** -3.515*** -1.014 -3.404*** -3.709*** 
 (3,549.738) (0.085) (0.073) (0.081) (0.057) (0.054) (0.839) (0.067) (0.043) 
           Observations 23 21,038 21,056 21,038 24,244 24,244 36 21,056 24,284 
Log Likelihood -5.052 -2,697.846 -2,700.918 -2,790.565 -3,052.512 -3,195.726 -7.680 -2,791.467 -3,091.301 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 20.105 5,403.692 5,407.835 5,587.130 6,111.024 6,395.453 19.360 5,586.934 6,186.602 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the standard 
error. 
The other models reveal that the other variables do not affect each other’s 
statistical significance. As for the results, while the Ratio of the Capabilities is negatively 
related to the formation of alliances, the Geographical Proximity is positively related. In 
other words, states with weak national capabilities tend to ally with stronger states. On 
the other hand, states that are geographically closer are more likely to ally with each 
other. As for the Difference in Regime Types, there is not enough evidence to infer that it 
is statistically significant on the 95% confidence level.  
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5. The Cold War (1945–1990) 
As can be seen from Table 7, all of the regression models yield similar results, in 
which all the independent variables are statistically significant to the formation of 
alliances in the Cold War era.  
While the Ratio of the Capabilities, the Trade Exchange, and Geographical 
Proximity are positively related to the formation of alliances, the Difference in Regime 
Types is negatively related. In other words, countries with higher trade exchange, similar 
national capabilities, and that are geographically closer are more likely to ally with each 
other. As for the Difference in Regime Types, it is negatively related to alliance 
formation, which means that similar regime types tend to ally together.  
Table 7.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1945–1990 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of CINC 0.607*** 0.542***  0.691
*** 0.453*** 0.639***    
 (0.027) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)    
          Trade Exchange 0.0003***      0.0003
***   
 (0.00001)      (0.00001)   
          Difference  
in Regime 
Types 
-0.075*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.080***    -0.081
***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001)  
          Geographical 
Proximity 1.802
*** 2.156*** 2.197***  2.349
***    2.382
*** 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.014)    (0.014) 
          Constant -2.217*** -2.429*** -2.262*** -2.249*** -2.867*** -2.747*** -2.430*** -2.030*** -2.737*** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
           Observations 245,447 628,746 628,772 628,746 744,494 744,494 280,801 628,772 745,406 
Log Likelihood -64,465.7 -147,608.3 -148,126.0 -155,539.5 -179,205.6 -189,752.1 -80,341.2 -156,392.5 -180,996.0 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 128,941.5 295,224.5 296,258.0 311,084.9 358,417.1 379,508.2 160,686.5 312,789.1 361,995.9 




6. Post–Cold War Era (1990–2012)  
The results in the post–Cold War era are similar to those during the Cold War, as 
shown in Table 8, in which all the independent variables are statistically significant.  
Therefore, in the post–Cold War era, countries with higher trade exchange and 
similar national capabilities and that are geographically closer are more likely to ally with 
each other. As for the Difference in Regime Types, it is negatively related to alliance 
formation, which means that similar regime types tend to ally together.  
Table 8.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1991–2012 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Ratio of 
CINC 0.581
*** 0.478***  0.571
*** 0.426*** 0.583***    
 (0.033) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)    
          Trade 
Exchange 0.0001
***      0.0001
***   
 (0.00000)      (0.00000)   
          Diff. in 
Regime 
Types 
-0.163*** -0.172*** -0.164*** -0.180***    -0.170
***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001)  
          Geographical 
Proximity 2.061
*** 2.327*** 2.249***  2.460
***    2.404
*** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.019)    (0.018) 
          Constant -1.971*** -2.044*** -1.832*** -1.874*** -2.901*** -2.809*** -2.416*** -1.685*** -2.699*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
           Observations 177,287 427,488 532,606 427,488 610,472 610,472 252,608 532,606 766,544 
Log 
Likelihood -41,933.2 -90,605.4 -121,260.6 -95,851.8 -139,798.6 -146,523.3 -72,795.0 -126,341.4 -185,995.7 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 83,876.5 181,218.8 242,527.2 191,709.7 279,603.2 293,050.6 145,594.1 252,686.9 371,995.4 




D. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Based on our empirical analysis, the following can be inferred about the four 
hypotheses presented at the beginning of this chapter:  
(1) Hypothesis 1: The larger the difference in the capabilities of two states, 
the more likely they will ally. 
The results of the statistical analysis refute Hypothesis 1 in all the periods except 
World War II, which means that alliances between states of similar capabilities are more 
common in history than alliances between states of different capabilities. 
(2) Hypothesis 2: Stronger trade relations between two states lead to a higher 
likelihood for an alliance to form. 
The results of the statistical analysis support Hypothesis 2 in three historical 
periods (interwar period, Cold War, and post–Cold War era), while the relationship 
between trade exchange and alliance formation is insignificant in the other three periods 
(post-Napoleonic era, World War I, and World War II). 
(3) Hypothesis 3: A state is more likely to ally with another state of a similar 
regime type than with a state of a different regime type. 
Similar to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the results of the analysis of the 
relationship between the regime type and alliance formation are not uniform throughout 
the historical periods. On the one hand, the results for the post-Napoleonic era, the Cold 
War, and the post–Cold War era support Hypothesis 3. On the other hand, the results for 
the interwar period refute H3, as states of different regime types were more likely to form 
alliance partners. Finally, regime type is insignificant to alliance formation in World War 
I and World War II.  
(4) Hypothesis 4: It is more likely for states that are geographically closer to 
form an alliance than those that are geographically distant from each other.  
The results support Hypothesis 4 throughout the historical periods included in the 
analysis. In other words, geographical proximity is the only significant variable for 
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alliance formation under whatever prevailing system-level conditions exist in the 
different historical periods. 
Therefore, the results show that the four hypotheses tested in our analysis (except 
for Hypothesis 4) are neither totally supported nor totally refuted in all the historical 
periods. This means that the independent variables included in the analysis are 
statistically significant for understanding alliance formation patterns in some eras but not 
in others except for the geographical proximity that is always significant in forming 
alliances. Moreover, even when a variable is statistically significant, the significance 
might take a different trend in different eras, in which it is either positive, leading to a 
bigger chance of alliance formation, or negative, leading states to ally against each other. 
These findings support the argument presented in the main hypothesis.  
For example, in the case of the Ratio of the Capabilities, there is a positive 
relationship with Alliance Formation throughout the historical periods with the exception 
of World War II, in which a negative relationship can be observed. In the case of the 
Difference in Regime Types, there is not enough statistical evidence to prove or disprove 
differences in regime type and alliances during the two World Wars. As for the other 
periods, there is a shift from a negative relationship during the post-Napoleonic era to a 
positive relationship during the interwar period and them a return to a negative 
relationship during the Cold War and post–Cold War. Therefore, during the post-
Napoleonic era and the Cold War, states with similar regime types were more prone to 
form an alliance, while during the interwar years, the opposite was true.  
As assumed in the main hypothesis, the different prevailing conditions in different 
eras make it impossible for one single theory to explain alliance behavior patterns 
throughout history. The statistical analysis clearly supports this hypothesis. However, to 
understand why the different variables included in the analysis cause different behaviors 
in different eras, the following chapter presents a framework for assessing and comparing 
the different prevailing conditions by introducing system-level analysis. Systemic 
analysis is then be applied to each of the independent variables in separate sections to 
understand the effect of each of the state-level variables on alliance behaviors under 




According to Kenneth Waltz, “theories of international politics that concentrate 
causes at the individual level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating 
at the international level as well are systemic.”44 In this context, the systemic approach 
studies “the systems level, or structure, [as] distinct from the level of interacting units.”45 
With respect to the states, their behaviors depend heavily on the international system’s 
structure, and states in turn have an influence on the international outcomes.46 Waltz 
points out that “each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own 
internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well 
as by interactions with them.”47 The analysis at the state level by itself is not enough to 
explain why similar patterns emerge even when the domestic situation of states and their 
interaction differs. In this respect, structural concepts help to explain important and 
enduring patterns in international politics.48  
Non-realist theorists also consider analysis at both the unit level and the system 
level necessary to defend their theories. By advancing Balance of Interest theory, Randall 
Schweller claims that, at the unit level, the balance  
refers to the costs a state is willing to pay to defend its values relative to 
the costs it is willing to pay to extend its values. At the system level, it 
refers to the relative strengths of status quo and revisionist states.49  
Additionally, Brian Lai and Dan Reiter empirically test the constructivist theory 
of cooperation, which assumes that actors can overcome the self-interest problem by a 
collectively-oriented conception of interest with the regime type as one of its possible 
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manifestations.50 The theory of cooperation contrasts with the realist theory’s assumption 
of the states’ self-interest in an anarchic international system. Nevertheless, the authors 
argue that the different patterns of alliances related to similar regime types can be 
correlated to systemic changes.51 
With respect to system-level analysis, Waltz argues that “the structure of [the 
international] system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the 
system’s units [i.e., the states].”52 He contends that even if capabilities are unit attributes, 
“the distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide 
concept.”53 It is also not related to the interactions between states. In the case of 
alliances, for example, “an international-political system in which three or more great 
powers have split into two alliances remains a multipolar system.”54  
Many scholars have accepted the concept of system polarity and studied its effects 
on the behavior of the states. For example, William Wohlforth explains the effect of the 
distribution of capabilities on the status of states and therefore on their behavior. He 
contends that “if the status of states depends […] on their relative capabilities, and if 
states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect 
levels of satisfaction,”55 and, consequently, the behavior of states. Wohlforth studies how 
status competition differs in unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems leading to different 
propensities for war.56 Furthermore, Glenn Snyder uses the N-person prisoner’s dilemma 
to analyze alliance formations in both bipolar and multipolar systems.57 In his analysis, 
alliances in a multipolar system are not firm, and the possibility for defection or 
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realignment is always present.58 Moreover, alignment options in a multipolar system are 
open, and the states prefer to keep their commitments vague to preserve the opportunity 
for shifting partners or to bargain for more benefits from their current allies by showing 
that they have other alternatives.59 In contrast, in a bipolar system, the alliances are firm. 
The only two superpowers in the system are more committed by their own interests to 
prevent the realignment of their allies either by giving more incentives or by coercion.60  
Nevertheless, other researchers have also included the state of war and peace as 
another important factor in systemic analysis. Bruce Russett argues that it is important to 
differentiate between alliance behaviors in peace and war times.61 During wartime, states 
are under “heavy pressures to be on the winning side [rather] than on the losing side.”62 
In peacetime, alliances are formed for deterrence or for achieving the desired goals 
without engaging in war.63 Stephen Walt also claims that there is a difference in alliance 
behaviors between peace and war times, which makes “victorious coalitions [more] likely 
to disintegrate with the conclusion of peace.”64 Similarly, Sweeny and Fritz contend that 
in periods of total war, like the two World Wars, the international system becomes so 
threatening that great powers tend to form more alliances than they usually do in other 
circumstances.65 
As for the unit level analysis, Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder claim that 
variables included in Robert Jervis’s version of the security dilemma, such as technology, 
geography, and power variables, should be taken into consideration in Waltz’s systemic 
theory, which is based on the number of great powers that are used to explain behaviors 
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at the foreign policy level.66 They give the example of the contradictory behaviors of 
states in the alliances leading to the two World Wars, although the international system 
was multipolar in both cases. Before World War I, the states committed themselves 
unconditionally to their allies, while in World War II they avoided unconditional 
commitments and instead counted on other states “to bear the costs of stopping a rising 
hegemon.”67  
Moreover, Lai and Reiter argue that alliances are an important manifestation of 
international cooperation, and they represent “the primary expression of a state’s foreign 
policy preferences.”68 As a result, the study of the influence of domestic politics on the 
formation of alliances becomes essential. As for Brett Ashley Leeds, “without 
considering the impact of domestic institutions in the context of strategic behavior in the 
international system, the story remains incomplete.”69 Leeds concludes that scholars 
should consider jointly the domestic political constraints, the strategic behavior of 
leaders, and the international environment in their studies.70 Peter Gourevitch presents a 
similar argument when he contends that although the international system affects 
domestic politics in many ways, the choice of response at the state level requires 
explanation based on domestic politics.71 To reflect these arguments on alliance 
behavior, Robert Kaufman considers that “alliance behavior is not just a product of the 
international system: It also reflects the internal processes of states, ideology, and the 
perceptions of individual statesmen as well.”72  
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Therefore, to understand the similarities and differences in the patterns of 
alliances in the different periods, we apply an approach based on analysis at both the state 
level and the international system level. At the state level, the analysis includes the 
attributes of states (regime type, national capabilities) and their relations (geographical 
proximity and trade relations), which are included as independent variables in the logistic 
regression models in the previous chapter. Each of the following sections analyzes one of 
the independent variables included in the statistical analysis. Based on the results of 
regression models, when the state-level variables change in significance in relation to the 
dependent variable (alliance formation) from one period to another, a system-level 
analysis is applied to understand the reasons for this change; otherwise, when the results 
show that a certain variable is either significant or not throughout the periods, the 
analysis is limited to explaining the results on the state level and comparing the results 
with previous research by other scholars. On the international system level, the analysis 
includes, in addition to the polarity of the international system, the state of war and peace. 
As for the polarity of the system, we can differentiate between three systems in the 
periods included in this thesis. The nation-state system was multipolar until the end of 
World War II, after which it changed to bipolar with the rise of the United States and the 
Soviet Union as the two superpowers.73 In the post–Cold War era, the system became 
unipolar even in the presence of second-tier powers such as Russia and China.74  
B. REGIME TYPE 
Many scholars have explored the state’s regime type as a possible predictor of 
alliance behavior. While some argue that states with similar regime types are more likely 
to ally with each other, others dismiss any relationship between regime type and the 
formation of alliances. For example, Leeds contends that democratic states are 
characterized by the high level of accountability of their chief executives toward their 
populations, whereas autocratic states provide their leaders with a greater flexibility to 
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adjust policies.75 This difference leads to higher levels of cooperation among states with 
similar regime types than among states with different regime types.76 In Leeds’s opinion, 
this argument holds true for military alliances, which represent a high level of 
international cooperation.77 Similarly, Robert Kaufman argues that ideology and the 
internal processes of states are important in explaining alliance behavior although the 
constraints in the democratic process delay the process of alliance formation among 
democratic states.78  
On the contrary, Michael Simon and Erik Gartzke argue that states prefer to have 
alliance partners of opposite regime types because they bring different qualities to 
alliances.79 Walt claims that regime type has no clear effect on alliance formation 
according to his study of alliances in the Middle East, which reveals that alliances among 
states of similar domestic systems are as common as those among states of different 
domestic systems.80 As for Fordham and Poast, the size principle based on power has a 
more important role in alliance formation than regime type.81 In their opinion, Riker’s 
‘size principle,’ which assumes that states tend to form alliances with the minimum size 
to secure winning, is a powerful means to explain both offensive and defensive 
alliances.82  
Furthermore, several analysts claim that the relationship between regime type and 
alliance behaviors only applies to democracies. For instance, Randolph Siverson and 
Julian Emmons argue that democracies form alliances at a higher rate than would be 
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predicted.83 On the contrary, Douglas Gibler and Scott Wolford claim that democratic 
states do not necessarily ally with each other; however, the presence of an alliance 
increases the likelihood of a democratic transition.84 The difference in arguments about 
the effect of regime type on the process of alliance formation does not necessarily imply 
that some arguments are correct and others are not. In this section, we explain how all of 
these trends of alliance behaviors are possible under different systemic conditions, which 
supports our main hypothesis. 
The results of the statistical analysis presented in Chapter II have shown that 
states with similar regime types were more likely to ally during the post-Napoleonic 
(1816–1914), Cold War, and post–Cold War eras. On the contrary, states with different 
regime types were more likely to ally during the interwar period. Moreover, the regime 
type is not significant during the two World Wars. These results show a clear distinction 
in alliance behaviors in times of war and peace. The regime type is not a significant 
factor in alliance formation during the two World Wars, whereas in periods of relative 
peace, the regime type becomes significant for alliance choices, although with some 
differences between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems. 
The results of our analysis for the two World Wars conform to the arguments 
advanced by several researchers that security takes precedence over ideology, especially 
in periods of total war. Therefore, under extremely threatening conditions, similar to the 
two World Wars, the regime type becomes less relevant to alliance choices, as states tend 
to choose the alliance partners that enhance their security. This argument is at the basis of 
Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, in which he argues that states usually ignore ideological 
considerations when they are faced with threat.85 Moreover, Russet argues that there are 
many historical instances when states that have similar interests, including similar 
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ideologies, economic institutions, or political systems, have formed alliances.86 However, 
Russet admits that non-utilitarian preferences, including ideology, vary in influence in the 
different international systems.87 Russet contends that  
in wartime the competitive (zero-sum) elements […] are predominant; 
[whereas] in peacetime the cooperative non-zero-sum elements play a 
greater role than in war, because of the common interest many or all states 
may have in avoiding the costs of conducting a war. Under these 
circumstances [of peace], the role of ideology, political system and other 
nonutilitarian preferences are likely to be more important.88   
As for relative peace times, our results reveal that similar regime types were more 
likely to form alliances during the post-Napoleonic era, the Cold War and the post–Cold 
War era. On the contrary, different regime types were more likely to ally during the 
interwar period. To better understand the results, we use systemic level analysis based on 
polarity. These periods represent three different international systems (unipolar, bipolar, 
and multipolar). While similar regime types are more likely to ally in the bipolar system 
of the Cold War and the unipolar system of the post–Cold War era, the results for the 
multipolar systems of the post-Napoleonic era and the interwar period show contradictory 
results. This reflects the different characteristics of these systems.  
Many studies have focused on the differences between bipolar and multipolar 
systems. Waltz argues that the military interdependence in a bipolar system is low 
because third parties do not affect the balance of power when they shift alliances.89 
Accordingly, the two superpowers make their strategies based on their interests and to 
cope with each other rather than to satisfy their alliance partners.90 In contrast, in a 
multipolar system, with the great powers having roughly equal capabilities, military 
interdependence is high, as states need the help of others for their security, and they have 
to look for common interests among many competing ones, which leads to more 
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uncertainty and a less stable system. In other words, the uncertainties arising from the 
competition between the great powers in a multipolar system do not permit for a clear 
and fixed differentiation between allies and adversaries leading to higher rates of 
defection.91 Waltz explains how the shift from a multipolar system to a bipolar system 
after World War II influenced the behaviors of the European states. In his opinion, 
because of the emergence of two superpowers from outside the region, the politics among 
European states shifted from a zero-sum game model to one of more cooperation.92 
Lai Dan Reiter have tried to explain this difference by conducting a 
comprehensive empirical study on all the alliances from 1816 and 1992. They test three 
theories that predict the role of domestic politics on the likelihood of alliances, two of 
which are related to regime type. The first is the “Credible Commitments” theory, which 
predicts that democracies can be more credible to commit and consequently more likely 
to ally with each other.93 They also test the constructivist theory, which “holds that states 
with similar regime type are likely to recognize collective interest and identity and 
therefore be more likely to ally with one another.”94 They examine each dyad of states 
from 1816 to 1992, and in one of their models, they split the dataset into two sets: 
alliances before 1945 and those after 1945. The results of their analysis reveal that after 
1945, states of similar regime types have a higher propensity to form alliances than states 
of different regime types with no preference to democracies over authoritarian regimes.95  
In Lai and Reiter’s opinion, the results of their analysis reflect the politics of the 
Cold War, which was based on three main factors. First, the two superpowers tried to 
establish global spheres of influence with advances in military, transportation, and 
communications technologies, which caused every place in the world to be politically 
significant. Second, “divisions of power matched divisions of ideology. The United 
States and the [Soviet Union] were not just the two superpowers, but they also had 
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completely different political systems.”96 Third, the Cold War witnessed the birth of new 
states, and this presented the two superpowers with the opportunity to intervene through 
economic or military means to pressure their allies to adopt political systems similar to 
their own. A similar conclusion is reached by Simon and Gartzke, who argue that the 
correlation between alliances and similar regime types are mainly influenced by the Cold 
War bipolarity and the formation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.97 Similarly, Walt 
contends that security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences; 
however, in a stable bipolar system, the impact of ideology has a greater influence.98 
The results of the statistical analysis presented by Lai and Reiter are similar to the 
results revealed in this thesis for the Cold War period. As for the periods preceding the 
Cold War, the limitation of their analysis is that these periods cannot be analyzed as one 
period, especially for the two World Wars, although they all represent a multipolar 
system. Moreover, separating the post-Napoleonic era from the interwar period reveals 
completely opposite alliance behaviors. This clearly reflects the uncertainty in alliance 
behaviors in a multipolar system and supports the argument of Waltz, Christensen and 
Snyder, and Snyder that were presented earlier in this chapter. The structural instability 
of the multipolar system, the military interdependence of the alliance partners and the 
high degree of uncertainty regarding security calculations can cause states to have 
contradictory alliance behaviors. Therefore, predicting alliance behaviors in relation to 
regime type becomes extremely complicated.  
From a historical context, in the post-Napoleonic era, similar regime types, 
whether liberal states or monarchies, collaborated to oppose any movements that 
threatened their legitimacy, as in the case when Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary 
formed the Holy Alliance to counter the threat of liberal revolutions in the 1820s.99 
Further examples include “the Treaty of Munchengratz in 1833 and the Quadruple 
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Alliance of 1834, which divided Europe neatly along ideological lines.”100 The role of 
ideology was also clear in forming “the League of the Three Emperors in 1873 [that] 
united similar states in opposition to alternative political systems.”101 On the other hand, 
the interwar period had different dynamics that caused different regime types to ally 
together for several reasons. Siverson and Emmons explain that the democratic alliances 
started to dissolve after the First World War, and after 1932, “the number of democracies 
dropped and the alliances often stayed intact. [Moreover,] nations, particularly 
democracies, were so desperate for security that alliances were tried that previously 
would have been unthinkable.”102  
While most realist theorists focus on the differences between bipolar and 
multipolar systems, they ignore the possibility of a unipolar system and implicitly 
consider it as unstable. However, the unipolar system became a reality at the end of the 
Cold War. As William Thompson puts it, “unipolarity is a relatively alien concept in 
most international relations theory. It is not something that is supposed to happen, 
courtesy of balance-of-power reactions, according to most realists.”103 However, recent 
studies have shown that the unipolar system is more stable and enduring than previously 
assumed. For instance, William Wohlforth argues that the uncertainty is minimal in a 
unipolar system, and second-tier states will either bandwagon with the only superpower 
or avoid actions than enhance its enmity.104 This leads to fewer “incentives for security 
or prestige competition among the great powers.”105 While many neorealists expected 
unipolarity to be quickly replaced by multipolarity as major powers try to balance against 
the United States, the United States instead has shaped the preferences of many ascending 
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powers, including Germany, Japan, and France.106 In addition, other states in Eastern 
Europe have constrained their domestic and foreign policies substantially to join the U.S.-
led NATO alliance.107 However, Michael Mastanduno contends that  
balance-of-threat theory can explain the persistence of unipolarity, but to 
do it must focus on both on the distribution of capabilities and, at the unit 
level, on foreign policy intentions and behavior […] [This is based on the] 
American belief that U.S. power does not threaten anyone, and that the 
U.S.-led international order provides sufficient benefits so that it is 
unnecessary for other states to undermine it.108  
Thompson similarly argues that “balancing against the system leader […] is a low 
probability occurrence because system leaders do not seek hegemony and territorial 
control.”109  
In the unipolar system of the post–Cold War era, as argued by Sweeny and Fritz, 
status quo states (mostly democratic) tend to join overlarge alliances to preserve the 
benefits of the status quo.110 In other words, since the only superpower is a democratic 
state, we expect democracies will seek alliances with the United States to preserve the 
status quo, whereas non-democratic states will avoid allying against it. In this respect, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Eastern European states gradually turned 
into democracies and joined NATO. Accordingly, Kramer argues that Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic bandwagoned with the stronger coalition.111 
In summary, regime type is significant to alliance formation only in peacetime, as 
states will seek alliances based on security preferences in times of war. However, under 
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conditions of relative peace, our results show alternations between the different periods. 
We argue that this is a consequence of the international system’s polarity. Therefore, 
unipolar and bipolar systems provide sufficient conditions of stability for states to follow 
their ideological preferences. On the other hand, under a multipolar system, the 
conditions of uncertainty regarding states’ security and status competition make their 
alliance behavior according to regime type not authoritatively decisive. 
C. CAPABILITIES 
There is an important theoretical framework in international relations providing 
arguments that states’ relative capabilities substantially determine their interests for 
alliance formation. Certainly, the capability of a state is a critical factor in power and 
influence. For instance, when member states of an alliance have unbalanced power, there 
is a greater probability that the greater ally may force the weaker one into its preferred 
foreign policy. Our findings suggest that, during the examined historical periods, 
countries with similar capabilities are more likely to form an alliance with each other than 
with countries that have different capabilities; the only exception of this pattern was 
during World War II. We argue that in the absence of unique circumstances, such as the 
conditions that World War II created, states might search for allies with equal capabilities 
to have an opportunity for a balanced relationship. Within this section, we intend to 
provide evidence that supports this argument by examining related literature and 
historical background. 
One of the most dominating theories within the literature on alliances is the 
capability aggregation model, which maintains that when a state’s power is measured, it 
has to be augmented with the power capability of its allies. In other words, the followers 
of this theory emphasize the role of increasing national power through external means, 
namely, alliance formation. Liska argues that “states enter into alliances with one another 
in order to supplement each other’s capability.”112 James D. Morrow categorizes this 
model as symmetric alliance and defines it as follows: “nations form alliances to increase 
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their security by massing their capabilities against a common enemy. The need for the 
alliance ends when the threat passes.”113 
Morrow then finds that alliances are not always formed to receive security 
benefits, but he provides an alternative explanation for alliance formation. He contends 
that in many cases the weaker partner in the alliance provides autonomy benefits for the 
stronger partner in exchange for security, leading to what he calls an asymmetric 
alliance.114 Moreover, Morrow concludes that asymmetric alliances both occur more 
frequently and last for a longer period than symmetric alliances. He explains this 
behavior by the virtue of major powers that positively influence the durability and 
stability of the alliance.115 Our results differ from Morrow’s finding in that states with 
similar capabilities are more likely to form an alliance in every period but one. The 
contrast might originate from different applied methods of examination. 
D. Scott Bennett is one of the scholars who challenges Morrow’s methodology. 
Bennett contends that  
Morrow found evidence supporting the model when it was applied to 
alliance termination (which he argues is a critical test). However, 
Morrow’s empirical analysis was specifically an examination of the 
limited variables emerging from the security-autonomy model rather than 
a general analysis of alliance duration, and so his study did not include 
variables from other perspectives. As a result, Morrow’s models are 
misspecified if in fact variables from the other perspectives presented here 
have important effects on alliance duration.116 
Furthermore, although Warren does not try to challenge either Morrow’s methodology or 
his findings, he also presents results that are different from those of Morrow. Warren uses 
stochastic actor-oriented models to show the patterns of interstate alliance decisions, and 
he finds that in his models “the significant negative coefficient for Capability Ratio 
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indicates that states prefer to form alliance ties with partners who possess similar levels 
of military capabilities, in contrast to the expectations of Morrow (1991).”117 
Morrow’s analysis, that states with different capabilities are more prone to ally 
with each other, involves the alliances formed between 1815 and 1965 and supports only 
the period of World War II from our findings. Although his approach and methodology 
are challenged by other authors, as presented previously in this paper, Morrow’s 
autonomy-security trade-off model of alliances is strongly applicable for an international 
order when there is a great need for alliances with disproportionate strengths of states. 
This need might be the strongest during times of war when the very existence of states is 
at stake.  
As we pointed out in the introduction section of this chapter, it is important to 
differentiate between the states of war and peace with regard to systemic analysis. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that there is a deviation in the trends of alliance formation 
during periods of war and peace. In wartime, weaker states are not necessarily aspiring to 
form alliances with coequal partners (considering the national material capabilities) in the 
first place, but are rather bandwagoning with a stronger (and often adversarial) ally to 
avoid the greater threat to their existence. John Mearsheimer states that “good examples 
of bandwagoning are the decisions by Bulgaria and Romania to ally with Nazi Germany 
in the early stages of World War II and then shift their allegiance to the Soviet Union 
near the end of the war.”118 
Thus, during wartime, states with different national material capabilities might be 
more likely to form an alliance than during peacetime. Accepting this argument raises an 
important question: Why did states with similar capabilities more frequently ally with 
each other in World War I? In other words, how can we explain the difference in alliance 
behaviors between World War I and World War II? A similar question is considered by 
Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, who explore the reason for differences between 
the alliance behavior of European states before the First World War and their behavior 
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approaching World War II, “despite the fact that the system was multipolar in both 
cases.”119 Christensen and Snyder find that  
in the earlier period, states allowed themselves to be dragged into war by 
their allies, as if they were in a ‘chain gang,’ but in the later period they 
‘passed the buck’ to allies in an attempt to avoid the cost of war. Some 
important variable other than system structure must have been at play. 
That variable, the authors suggest, was the prevailing belief as to whether 
offensive or defensive capabilities were superior.120 
Mearsheimer has used the same argument as a possible explanation for different 
behaviors of states against hegemons throughout the previous centuries. Mearsheimer 
finds that  
we see the least amount of buck-passing against Wilhelmine Germany 
[comprises the period between 1890 and 1918]. The Triple Entente, which 
included the United Kingdom, France, and Russia and which was designed 
to contain Germany, was largely in place by 1907, some seven years 
before World War I broke out. […] Much more buck-passing arose against 
Nazi Germany than there had been against Wilhelmine Germany. Hitler 
came to power in January 1933 and almost immediately began building a 
powerful military. The Third Reich’s main rivals—the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union—never formed a balancing coalition against 
Nazi Germany. In fact, all three pursued buck-passing strategies during the 
1930s.121 
Therefore, a very different alliance behavior can be observed leading to World 
War II than before World War I, which might appear to account (at least partially) for the 
different patterns of states’ alliance behavior during the two wars. 
Another potential reason for the difference in alliance behaviors between World 
War I and World War II is that the capabilities of the states involved in the Second World 
War were much more diverse than those of the states that participated in the First World 
War. As David E. Kaiser points out:  
The Second World War confirmed the lesson of the First: that no 
European power had the economic resources to compete with the 
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economic might of the United States, which furnished most of the supplies 
for the Allied war effort against Germany and simultaneously defeated 
Japan as well. While the Germans, British, and Soviets each produced 
between 112,000 and 137,000 aircraft during the war, the United States 
built 300,000; while the Germans produced 45,000 tanks, the United 
States built 87,000 and the Soviets 103,000. Although both the Soviet 
Union and the western Allies eventually learned to use the techniques of 
blitzkrieg to defeat the German armies and reconquer Europe, they 
consistently relied upon material superiority to win their victories.122  
The greater diversity during World War II might obviously lead to an opportunity, 
especially for weaker states, to bandwagon with greater powers in order to ensure 
advantages during different stages of the war. 
In summary, our findings suggest that during peacetime, states seek equal partners 
to avoid pressures from stronger partners in unbalanced relationships, which is reflected 
in the three periods of relative peace included in our analysis. On the other hand, states 
may worry less about these pressures during periods of greater threat, especially 
existential threats. Therefore, in times of global war, such as World War II, weaker states 
seek stronger allies in order to enjoy security. However, this is not always the case, as 
demonstrated by Morrow’s autonomy-security trade-off model of alliances. This explains 
the different alliance behaviors of states during World War I and World War II; states’ 
perceptions of each other’s offensive and defensive capabilities in the period leading to 
war directly affected their alliance behaviors. 
D. GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY 
The conventional wisdom is that geographical proximity is the source of 
territorial disputes and conflicts of interests between states. For instance, Walt argues that 
neighboring states are more threatening for each other than those who are distant as “the 
ability to project power declines with distance.”123 However, many recent empirical 
studies have shown that “states prefer to form alliance ties with partners who are 
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geographically close.”124 As mentioned earlier, we assumed that states are geographically 
close in our statistical analysis models if they fall within the first three groups in the 
Direct Contiguity classification system, which includes states that share a common 
border, are separated by a river, or are separated up to 24 miles by a body of water. Lai 
and Reiter use two models to test a similar claim about the association between distance 
and dyadic alliance formation. In their first model, in which they use the complete data 
set for alliances from 1816 to 1992, they find that states prefer to have geographically 
closer allies.125 As for their second model, the result of their analysis also shows a similar 
outcome even when considering only the alliances between 1946 and 1992.126 
Our results for the relationship between geographical distance and alliance 
formation conform with the empirical studies mentioned above: States that are 
geographically closer are more likely to ally with each other than are those that are more 
distant from one to another. It is important to note that in our analysis, this relationship 
does not change under different international systems and between times of peace or war. 
It might be obvious in a dataset that includes dyads for all the possible alliances in the 
world that states will choose alliance partners from their region or continent rather than 
allying with a distant state. For this reason, we introduce a new model to check for a 
possible bias in the analysis. In our new model (see Table 9), we only include European 
countries to check if the relationship still applies in the same continent as well. The 
reason for choosing Europe is that this was the theater for the most important events and 
conflicts during the periods included in our analysis, especially from the post-Napoleonic 
War until the end of World War II.  
The results in Table 9 reveal that European states prefer to have alliances with 
closer states in all the periods of the analysis, which supports the original finding. In 
other words, even though most of the conflicts and wars in Europe were about territorial 
expansion and competition among neighboring states, those states still preferred to have 
alliances with other proximate states. 
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Table 9.   Logit Regressions—Alliance Formation from 1816–2012 in 
Europe (Independent Variables Excluding the Trade Exchange) 
 
 Alliance Behavior (Formed or Not Formed) 
  














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ratio of CINC 0.436*** 0.625** 1.233*** -0.849** 0.401*** 0.291*** 
 (0.100) (0.307) (0.140) (0.376) (0.052) (0.058) 
       Difference in  
Regime Types -0.094
*** 0.026 0.029*** 0.007 -0.149*** -0.182*** 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) 
       Geographical 
Proximity 1.800
*** 0.481** 1.966*** 1.819*** 0.713*** 1.267*** 
 (0.053) (0.221) (0.083) (0.196) (0.036) (0.044) 
       Constant -2.891*** -2.814*** -4.217*** -3.144*** -0.366*** -1.229*** 
 (0.056) (0.191) (0.098) (0.215) (0.026) (0.028) 
        Observations 25,274 1,492 14,008 2,126 29,686 25,310 
Log Likelihood -5,466.768 -433.876 -2,422.152 -425.809 -14,321.030 -11,684.540 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,941.530 875.751 4,852.303 859.619 28,650.060 23,377.070 
 Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The number in parentheses is the 
standard error. 
 
Fordham and Poast claim that the absence of overwhelming coalitions in world 
politics can be explained by geographical distance. In their words, “geography is [a] 
source of heterogeneous interests because states in different locations will have different 
preferences about the placement of the alliance’s military resources.”127 Therefore, 
Fordham and Poast present two reasons why alliances are less likely with distance: the 
difference in interests between distant states and the ability to project military capabilities 
across distant states. Even in cases when distant states might share common interests, 
defending these interests depends on the availability of military resources. The cost of 
pooling military resources across long distances becomes problematic, and many states 
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can only project their power capabilities to support closer allies.128 In this respect, with 
the exception of a few major states in each period, most states cannot pursue interests in 
far regions or in other continents. Some of these major states include Great Britain, 
France, Italy, and Russia during the colonial era and most likely only the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
Furthermore, alliance formation might be the consequence of conflict settlement 
among neighboring states. Gibler emphasizes the importance of using power politics 
when states intend to resolve their territorial conflicts. Gibler contends that a solution for 
such a situation might be a well-proven technique, the use of alliances.129 He provides a 
list of suitable cases from the 19th and 20th centuries when “states have either exchanged 
territory or agreed to the status quo settlement of territory and have then cemented their 
new relationship with the signing of an alliance.”130 Therefore, geographical proximity 
can be considered an effective indicator of alliance formation even if the would-be 
partners are in conflict or at least have issues to solve prior to signing a defense pact. 
In summary, although neighboring states are usually perceived as the source of 
threat and conflict, the results of our analysis have shown that geographically closer 
states are more likely to form alliances in all periods and under all systemic conditions. 
This holds true even when we limit our analysis to alliances among European states. We 
argued that this is mainly because of the different interests between distant states, the 
incapability of most states to project military capabilities to far regions, and the use of 
alliances to resolve territorial disputes among neighboring countries.   
E. TRADE EXCHANGE 
Our results suggest that economic relations—the total size of the Trade 
Exchange—are related to alliance formation between states. However, a more thorough 
examination of the results might reveal that Trade Exchange is not necessarily the cause 
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of alliance formation, but rather the consequence of it. Therefore, a further comparison of 
the results with the existing theories may be indispensable. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of scholars have sought empirical 
evidence to evaluate the important elements of recent literature on alliances and 
international trade. There are theorists who argue the importance of alliances and 
maintain the importance of alliances on the world stage in increasing free trade between 
allies. On the other hand, other approaches have questioned that trade flows are greater 
within alliances. Further disagreements in findings are related, for instance, to the role of 
the established international order or to the potential gravity of a major power included in 
the alliance. A review of well-known arguments gives us a better insight into the trade 
and alliance relationship. 
Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield apply analytical tools to corroborate their 
initial argument that free trade is much more likely to advance within an alliance than 
among potential or actual adversaries. They “argue that the play of power politics is an 
inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets because trade 
produces security externalities.”131 Gowa explains the necessity to maintain trade among 
allies by claiming that gains accrued from trade between allies bolster the mutual security 
goals and strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, she argues, trade exchange with 
potential adversaries might generate unfavorable security externalities.132 An illustrative 
example is the economies of the Communist states beginning from 1948: 
In a short time […] their trade relations with non-Communist states 
became negligible. Direct trade with the USSR amounted in 1951 to 29 
per cent in the case of Hungary (which had practically no trade with the 
USSR before the war); 58 per cent in the case of Bulgaria; 25 per cent in 
the case of Poland; 51 per cent in the case of Rumania; and 28 per cent in 
the case of Czechoslovakia. In turn, about 80 per cent of all Soviet trade in 
1951 was with the People’s Democracies [that include Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR – more 
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commonly known as East Germany), Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and 
Yugoslavia].133 
More innovative views on the relationship between alliances and trade have been 
developed by Mansfield and Richard Bronson, who also maintain that “international trade 
is likely to be greater when trading partners are allies [with the extension that it is also 
more likely if the participants are] members of a preferential trading arrangement.”134 
They argue that the combination of these two conditions yields to “a greater impetus to 
trade than does either of these institutions alone.”135 They present empirical evidence to 
“indicate that allies conduct more trade than do non-allies and that the formation of 
alliances tends to generate increases in trade. […] [After further analyses they] found no 
evidence that trade flows or changes in them influence the formation of alliances.”136 
This is in accordance with our conclusion that trade exchange between states might not 
be the causation of alliance formation, but the consequence of it. 
In contrast with the concept that alliances give rise to trade, Morrow et al. do not 
find enough statistical evidence to infer that there is either a positive or a negative 
relationship between the two variables. They argue that “the effect of alliances on trade 
flows is uncertain; they may increase or decrease trade.”137 Furthermore, they point out 
that their results disprove the former arguments that “security concerns lead states to 
control their trade flows.”138 Morrow et al. indicate that “joint democracy and the 
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similarity of policy interests between the states”139 are more decisive aspects than 
alliances. According to their theory, similar political systems—democracies above all—
pose less political risk toward each other. Thus, they provide greater protection for trade 
with potential trading partners, which has a positive effect on trade flows between these 
states. For instance, former analyses proved that “U.S. exports were greater to democratic 
trading partners [than to nondemocratic states].”140 
Andrew G. Long provides an alternative explanation for the previously mentioned 
inconsistent findings. He argues that “when designing empirical analyses, researchers 
include a much broader range of security agreements in the category of military alliance 
than necessary to capture the concept in their argument.”141 Long arrives at the same 
conclusion as we did in our hypothesis; among the different types of alliances—defense 
pact, neutrality and non-aggression pact, and entente—only the defense pacts meet the 
required indicators for a military alliance. “Namely those classified as defense pacts, 
obligate the members to provide military assistance to a partner in the event of an attack 
upon the partner’s sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.”142 Thus, after narrowing down 
the model, Long finds statistical evidence that “defense pacts [between major powers 
from 1885 to 1990] are positively related to dyadic trade levels, and that their non-
defense-pact counterparts are not significantly related to trade in a dyad.”143 
Another possible explanation for the varying results of the alliance and trade 
relationship is dedicated to Long and Leeds, who argue that another factor is also 
complementary to the relationship between alliance formation and increased trade. They 
find empirical evidence that additional promises of economic cooperation prompt allies 
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to trade more with each other than with states that have no economic ties to the allies.144 
Long and Leeds attribute the following example from 1936 to this theory: 
While there were a number of sources of Belgian dissatisfaction with the 
military relationship with France, one source was what Belgium viewed as 
France’s failure to continue to provide adequate access to the French 
market for Belgian exporters. As a result of the Depression, France had 
imposed import quotas and high tariffs, as well as quota on Belgians 
permitted to work in France. […] Repeatedly unsuccessful attempts to 
negotiate a new commercial agreement created increasing Belgian 
dissatisfaction with the Belgian–French relationship and was one cause of 
the Belgian decision to terminate the alliance. Belgian defection on the 
military alliance was linked to French defection on commercial 
agreements.145 
In summary, every state may be concerned with whether its trading partner uses 
the gains from that trade for hostile intentions, which creates the negative security 
externalities described previously. Allies may worry less because there is a greater 
chance that the partner state uses its gains in accordance with the alliance’s policy. 
Therefore, the security externalities are either positive or remain at least neutral in most 
cases. In general, this suggests that more trust usually leads to greater trade exchange. 
Our findings coincide with these arguments. The previously mentioned studies also found 
it difficult to explain the alliance and trade relationship before World War I and during 
the World Wars due to the absence of reliable data. In the meantime, however, we find 
statistical evidence that alliances are positively related to trade during the interwar period, 
the Cold War, and the post–Cold War eras, which is consistent with former studies. 
F. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In this chapter, we used system-level analysis based on the polarity of the 
international system and the state of war or peace to analyze the alliance behavior of 
states with regard to the four state-level variables included in the statistical analysis (i.e., 
regime type, national capabilities, geographical proximity, and trade relations). We first 
argued that states with similar regime types are likely to ally with each other in times of 
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relative peace under unipolar or bipolar international systems. However, in times of total 
war, security considerations take precedence, and regime type becomes insignificant for 
alliance formation. Second, geographical proximity is significant for alliance formation 
under all system conditions because of the inability of most states to project their military 
capabilities into distant places to defend faraway allies. Third, states with similar national 
capabilities are more likely to ally with each other in times of peace under all types of 
international systems because they prefer a balanced relationship. In contrast, state 
alliance decisions are not consistent in times of war, as the preferences for security or 
autonomy differ according to their perception of the level of threat from other states. 
Finally, we argued that the formation of alliances in times of peace plays a significant 
role in enhancing, rather than worsening, the trade exchange between countries. 
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In this thesis, we argued that the reason why there is not a single theory that 
explains all alliance formation patterns is because of the different prevailing conditions at 
the system level in different periods. Instead, we offered an alternative based on 
analyzing each period separately. Next, we tested the effect of four state-level variables 
(regime type, trade exchange, states’ national capabilities, and geographical proximity) 
on the alliance behavior of states in each period using logistic regression analysis. Then, 
we presented an approach for understanding the different alliance behaviors based on 
linking the alliance behaviors to the prevailing system-level conditions in each period. 
The systemic analysis we used focused on differentiating between times of peace and war 
in addition to distinguishing between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international 
systems. Based on the results of the statistical analysis of the state-level variables and on 
the system-level analysis, we can deduce the following. 
First, states of similar regime types are likely to ally with each other in times of 
relative peace under a unipolar or bipolar international system. The arguments about the 
stability of the unipolar and bipolar systems allow us to expect that regime type will have 
a significant influence on alliance choices under these systems in peacetime only. Under 
a multipolar system, alliances based on similar regime types are not certain due to the 
uncertainties faced by states with respect to alliance partners under the conditions of 
multipolarity. On the other hand, regime type becomes insignificant in the alliance 
decisions of states in times of total war, and security considerations prevail over 
ideological preferences. 
Second, geographical proximity is a major factor in alliance choices whether in 
peace or war times and under all system-level conditions. States tend to have 
geographically proximate alliance partners although border disputes and threats are 
expected to be higher from neighboring states. The preference toward close alliance 
partners is mainly due to the fact that most states cannot project their military capabilities 
into distant places and consequently cannot commit to defend faraway allies. 
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Third, states with similar national capabilities are more likely to ally with each 
other in times of peace under all types of international systems. In other words, most 
alliances in peacetime seek a balanced relationship. On the contrary, in times of war, the 
states’ alliance decisions are weighted based on a trade-off between security and 
autonomy. Accordingly, alliance decisions are not consistent among all states, as some of 
them prefer security over autonomy, whereas others prefer the opposite. Moreover, the 
level of diversity in national capabilities between states may also affect alliance choices, 
as in the cases of World Wars I and II. 
Fourth, the relationship between trade exchange and alliance formation is 
significant in peacetime under all system-level conditions. However, in this thesis, we 
argued that the reverse relationship is the most probable, meaning that the formation of 
alliances is a significant factor for enhancing the trade exchange between countries and 
not the opposite. In times of war, the relationship is not clear mainly because of a lack of 
data. However, one would expect that security prevails over other preferences in wartime 
as previously argued for other variables.  
For future exploration of this topic, we recommend the following research ideas. 
First, further refinement and testing of the findings might provide additional unrevealed 
explanations about alliance formation. For example, supplementary analysis of multipolar 
systems can offer clearer distinctions about alliance behaviors under multipolarity. This 
can be done by further dividing the multipolar systems to capture more crucial and 
influential events and by dividing the post-Napoleonic era into two periods, before the 
Crimean War and after it. Additionally, in the analysis of the bipolar system, it would be 
interesting to consider a case when the two superpowers do not have different ideologies. 
Similarly, in a unipolar system, it is probably worth examining another historical period 
with the superpower having a different regime type and/or foreign policy than that of the 
United States. Second, we suggest examining additional independent variables to test 
state-level alliance behavior, which might capture more relevant behaviors to alliance 
formation patterns. This can include variables that measure interstate relations prior to 
forming alliances, states’ alliance reputation and commitments in previous alliances, and 
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states’ degree of satisfaction of their status. This is also dependent on the presence of data 
that covers different historical periods.  
Alliance formation is one of the most explored topics in international relations 
and it will probably remain so for many years to come. The methodology used in this 
thesis makes it easier to understand alliance patterns by dividing history into distinct 
periods and then analyzing alliance behaviors based on the prevailing system-level 
conditions in these periods. This thesis by no means presents a theory in alliance 
formation, and this is exactly what is argued in our main hypothesis. It is not possible to 
find one single theory that explains all alliance formation behaviors throughout history 
because of the different prevailing system-level conditions in different eras. However, 
under similar system-level conditions, we expect to have similar alliance formation 
patterns. The approach presented in this thesis and the findings may provide a new 
perspective in understanding alliance formation patterns. By relating the alliance patterns 
to system-level conditions, we might better understand alliance behaviors under similar 
conditions in future alliances.  
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